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We develop a framework to assess the statistical signicance of expected
default frequency calculated by credit risk models. This framework is then
used to analyze the quality of two commercially available models that have
become popular among practitioners: KMV Credit Monitor and RiskCalc from
Moody's.
Using a unique database of expected default probability from both vendors,
we study both the consistency of the prediction and its timeliness. We introduce
the concept of cumulative accuracy prole (CAP) that allows to see in one
curve the percentage of defaulting companies captured by the models one year
in advance. We also use the Miller's information test to see if the models add
information to the S&P rating.
The result of the analysis indicates that these models indeed add relevant
information not accounted for by rating alone. Moreover, with respect to rating
agencies, the models predict defaults more than ten months in advance on
average.
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11 Introduction
The three pillars of the recently reinforced Basel Capital Accord, which by 2004
will be adopted by regulators in most industrialized countries, are minimum capital
requirements, supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and internal
assessment process, and market discipline through disclosure of banking practices. In
particular, with the Basel Capital Accord of 1998, banks around the world have been
allowed to assess regulatory capital issues related to credit risk by means of internal
models. At the same time the development of the securitization of bond portfolios has
brought to light the need for quantitative estimation of credit risks. Both phenomena
largely explain why credit risk modeling has been evolving at a rapid pace over the
last few years, and many commercially available models have appeared on the market.
Among the latest releases we nd RiskCalc, a tool by Moody's Risk Management
Services (RMS), which is based both on a structural Merton approach [1] and on a
statistical non-linear multi-factor model, generalizing early ideas of Altman [2]. For
more information about commercially available credit risk models, we refer the reader
to the excellent review paper by Crouhy et al. [3].
The purpose of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, to propose statistical
methods to quantitatively evaluate the quality of credit risk models. On the other
hand, to use them for studying and assessing two commercially available systems:
the KMV Credit Monitor (KMV) and Moody's Risk Calc4. We perform a rolling
statistical analysis in time of the predicting power of both models. To our knowledge,
such kind of analysis has never been attempted before by an independent group.
The purpose is not to rate the models against each other but rather to assess their
usefulness. Indeed, we shall show in this paper that both models contain important
information for predicting the risk of a company defaulting. Thus, they can provide
at the same time early warning signals and quantitative risk assessment to credit and
surety underwriters.
The work we present here required serious eorts from our side both in terms of
understanding the data provided by the two companies and in terms of processing
them in a consistent way. The outline of the paper reects the procedure we followed:
we start by discussing the input default probability and credit rating data, their
sources and the criteria we use to interpret them. Then we illustrate the methodology
followed in the analysis, presenting in detail the nature of the tests performed and
their results.
2 Structural vs. Hybrid Credit Risk Models
As a brief theoretical review, the idea underlying the Merton model [1] is that, from
the shareholder's point of view, the equity value of a company, E, can be treated as a
4It is interesting to note that since we did this study in the summer of 2001 Moody's has bought
KMV and the two quantitative groups are now integrated.
2call option written on the value of assets, A, where the strike price, B, is given by all
the short-term liabilities, BS, plus half of the long-term ones, BL. The isomorphism
between the market value position of equity holders and the position of holders of a
call option on the rm's assets allows to write down the set of equations
E = f(A;A;r;B;T)
E = g(A); (1)
where A and E are asset and equity volatility respectively, r is the risk free
interest rate, and T is the time horizon of the option holder. From the two above
equations it is possible to obtain asset value and volatility, otherwise unobservable
quantities on a regular, short-term basis, from equity value and volatility, which are
easily available from stock market data. It provides a convenient framework to get rid
of the risk premium contained in the share price. Once the asset value and its volatility
are obtained, a distance to distress (or distance to default) can be determined as a
multiple of asset volatility,
DD =




It is clear from this equation that a default situation is approached when the expected
value of assets becomes closer and closer to the expected value of liabilities, and when
the asset volatility is large, therefore making it possible, from a statistical point of
view, to have insucient assets backing liabilities. Before the Merton model was
formulated, credit risk was dealt with by means of multi-factor analysis, following
early work by Altman [2]. The Altman Z-score model is a classication of corporate
borrowers, which can also be used to get a default probability prediction, based on
statistics performed on a sample of companies. The Z-score is dened as a linear
combination of accounting ratios. The linearity of the model has been criticized,
because the path to bankruptcy can be highly non-linear. Furthermore, since the
model is entirely based on accounting ratios, which appear only at discrete quarterly
intervals, its ability to pick up the risk of defaults in rapidly deteriorating conditions
has also been questioned. Because of the many open issues left on the table, the
Altman model has certainly contributed to open the way to the theory of credit risk
modelling and, as we will see below, it seems to inspire part of the ideas underlying
Moody's RiskCalc.
One of the commercial model making full and consistent use of the Merton ap-
proach is KMV Credit Monitor [4]. Based on historical Moody's default studies on
large samples of rms , the KMV model establishes on the one hand a functional
relationship between default probability and distance to distress, while, on the other
hand, it denes per each ocial credit rating group (the rating being assigned by an
agency such as Standard & Poors - S&P - or Moody's) an average default probability.
The overall result is a mapping between distance to distress and implied credit rating.
The KMV approach has been proved to be able to predict default earlier than rating
3Figure 1: Correlation between the Return on Asset (RoA) and the Raw Default Rate
(source Moody's).
agencies, as we will also show below. However, very recently, objections have been
raised about purely structural models, and their ability at providing accurate mea-
sures of default risk has been questioned. Among others, CreditRisk+ [5] developed
by Credit Suisse Financial Products proposes an actuarial approach instead of the
usual structural model.
The new Moody's tool, RiskCalc, is based on a hybrid approach. It relies on the
observation that, if we plot the relationship between distance to default and default
probability for sets of companies having dierent levels of Return on Assets (ROA) we
nd the very irregular surface of Figure 1. If ROA were not at all a driver of default
probability, we would nd a much smoother result coming from the exact repetition
along the ROA direction of the same curve dened in the Default Probability-Distance
to Default plane.
Nine factors have been found to be relevantly correlated to default probability.
They are:
1. Distance to Default, from the Merton model
2. Ocial Agency Rating
3. Return on Assets
4. Return on Equity
5. Size, dened by the amount of Total Assets
6. Liquidity, dened by the ratio of Working Capital over Total Assets
7. Leverage, dened by the ratio of Liabilities over Assets
4Universe KMV Credit Monitor Moody's RiskCalc




Table 1: Number of companies in the available datasets of KMV and Moody's
8. Equity Volatility
9. Equity Trend
By looking at the historical database of public companies, default probability is non-
linearly regressed vs. the above set of factors. At the same time, to each ocial
Moody's rating group a specic range (or value) of default probability is associated.
As for the KMV model, a mapping is thus obtained between default probability and
implied rating. A recent study by KMV [6] has put in doubt the relationship between
ROA and default probability. Based on a statistical study on Moody's cohorts, KMV
could not nd any added value in having supplemental ROA information, compared
to KMV expected default probability information alone. Their conclusion is that the
implementation of the Merton model by Moody's diers from their own. Unfortu-
nately, their comparative study is limited since they did not have access to the full
results of Moody's model. In the following sections, we directly study the output of
both KMV Credit Monitor and Moody's RiskCalc to see if they both add value and
how they compare to each other.
3 Input Data
3.1 Processing Data Universes
Both KMV Credit Monitor and Moody's RiskCalc provide databases with default
probability data. KMV Credit Monitor provides as well ocial S&P rating data,
although for a very limited subset of companies. In both cases data are reported on a
monthly basis for a total of 60 observations, ranging, for the purpose of this analysis,
from April 1996 to March 2001.
Default probabilities give us a prediction with a 12-month validity in the future.
Table 1 below gives an overview of the number of companies within the available
datasets. For North America, 9039 companies - about 90% of the entire universe
- could be identied in both the KMV and the Moody's databases by looking at a
combination of Company Name and Stock Market Ticker. These companies constitute
a common subset, on which the two models can be compared directly. Out of the 1935
S&P-rated North American Companies available in the KMV database, 1802 are also
present in the Moody's database. It should be pointed out that the comparison of
5KMV System Code S&P Rating KMV System Code S&P Rating
0 No indication 13 BB+
1 Unused 14 BB
2 AAA 15 BB-
3 Unused 16 B+
4 AA+ 17 B
5 AA 18 B-
6 AA- 19 CCC
7 A+ 20 CC
8 A 21 C
9 A- 22 D
10 BBB+ 23 CCC+
11 BBB 24 CCC-
12 BBB- 25 No indication
Table 2: Numerical encoding of S&P ratings in the KMV Database
the two models can only be performed on the North American database, since for the
European universe the amount of S&P rated companies is too low to be statistically
meaningful. We have stored default probabilities and, where available, associated
S&P-ratings, into Microsoft Excel-les. In particular, we have downloaded Moody's
Riskcalc data from the website. KMV Credit Monitor data are instead available
directly from the program conguration. Before analyzing data quantitatively, we
had to understand them. Since all the information, including the S&P rating, is
numerically encoded, we proceed as follows:
1. We nd the numerical equivalent of each S&P rating. Results are reported in
Table 2 below.
2. As discussed in the introduction, both KMV and Moody's establish a corre-
spondence between dierent levels of default probabilities and implied ratings,
based on historical default information of large samples of rms. We are inter-
ested in the default probabilities which are mapped to an S&P D-rating and
to a Moody's Caa rating (those are the ratings assigned to close-to-insolvent
obligors). We nd that such probability amounts to 20% for KMV, and 10:95%
5 or higher for Moody's (which is the cut-o point for the Caa class of Moody's
implied rating. It corresponds to obligors close to default).
5the Caa cuto point was obtained from private communication with Mr. B. Khandani (Moody's
RMS)
63.2 Data cleaning
In order to obtain a consistent data set, several exclusions both for EDF-values and
S&P ratings must be done:
1. Zero values of the default probability indicate that a company is not being
followed on a certain month. This might be due either to a lack of coverage or
to an exclusion following default. We analyse iteratively every single zero value
inside the database and decide to replace it with the S&P D- or Moody's Caa-
rating default probability (20% and 10:95% for KMV and Moody's, respectively)
when the zero immediately follows an observation of D - or Caa - rating default
probability.
2. Values of S&P rating equal to either 0 or 25 indicate once again a lack of
coverage on a certain month. Following the above reasoning, we have decided
that a 0 or a 25 following a 22 value of the S&P rating, which corresponds to
D, has to be replaced by 22, since it reects the situation of a defaulted obligor,
which is not any more covered by the rating agency.
These anomalous values of either default probability or S&P rating, however, are not
too numerous.
4 Data analysis: Methodology and Results
4.1 Model Predicted vs. Actual Defaults
We look at the predictive power of the two examined models by considering the subset
of S&P rated companies, where the default event is identied by the S&P rating of
D (numerically equivalent to 22, as in Table 2). We divide the sample into N = 6
default probability intervals whose spacing grows exponentially 6, as in Table 3 7.
We count the number of companies Cki falling into each interval, Ik, k = 1;:::;N at
time Ti, i = 1;:::;48. We limit ourselves to the 48th observation, because we need
to compare each model prediction with the actual number of occurred defaults 12
months later, and we have a total of 60 available observations. For each interval, we
measure the average default probability, ki. We dene the product
^ Dki = ki Cki ; (3)
as the expected number of defaults to be observed after 12 months, at time Ti+12.
We exclude from the analysis at each time Ti obligors having a D S&P rating (for
6Exponentially spaced intervals ensure a statistically adequate and more homogeneous number
of rms in each class, since the distribution of default probabilities is itself exponential.
7Courtesy of Moody's RMS
7Default Probability Classes
Financial Security Moody's Class Lower Bound Upper Bound
Exceptional-Excellent Aaa-Aa3 0:00% 0:07%
Good A1-A3 0:07% 0:15%
Adequate Baa1-Baa3 0:15% 0:73%
Questionable Ba1-Ba3 0:73% 3:16%
Poor B1-B3 3:16% 10:95%
Very Poor Caa1 and worst 10:95% 25:00%
Table 3: Default probability classes used for the analysis.
these the default event is, in fact, certain). For the companies belonging to each
class, we read o their S&P rating after 12 months and count the number of obligors
Dki having reached a D S&P rating (numerically equivalent to 22). We then test the
hypothesis
^ Dki = Dki ; (4)






^ Dki   Dki
2
( ^ Dki + Dki)
: (5)
This test can be used for the purpose of comparing the two models, by looking
at which has the lowest 2 per degree of freedom. In our case the number of degrees
of freedom (DF) is equivalent to the number of classes, 6 [8], and sets the critical 2
value to 2
c = 12:52.
The results we have found are reported in Appendix A respectively in Table 4
for the universe of S&P-rated companies in the KMV North American database, and
in Table 5 for the universe of S&P-rated companies in the Moody's North Ameri-
can database. We have deliberately omitted the rst 21 months of history, since too
few default events were observed during this time. The 2 values per observation
are plotted in Fig. 2 for each of the two models, together with the critical value
2
c, represented by the constant dashed line. We see that, although both models
give acceptable results from a statistical perspective, KMV Credit Monitor seems to
be superior, particularly for the last few observations, referring to the time window
between the last quarter 2000 and the rst quarter 2001, when the North Ameri-
can economy started to deteriorate and, correspondingly, the number of defaults to
increase. Notice also, from Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix A that the KMV Credit
Monitor predictions are superior to the Moody's RiskCalc ones especially in the last
two classes, corresponding to the most dangerous ranges of default probabilities (see
Table 3).




















Figure 2: 2 test results per observation for KMV (red line) and Moody's (blue line).
The dashed line represents the critical value, 2
c = 12:52 for the 6 DF available.
4.2 CAP Proles
For all the available observations, we build Cumulative Accuracy Proles (CAPs).
To do so, at each time Ti, i = 1;:::;48, we order companies by default probabilities,
from riskiest to safest. Then we consider the X% riskiest companies, varying X
between 0% and 100%, and check, 12 months later, what fraction Y (X) of defaulters
(default is dened again from the explicit S&P rating of D) comes from this subset.
For a model assigning random default probabilities, we should approximately nd the
line Y (X) = X. The more informative the model, the quicker the quantity should
approach 100%, and therefore the steeper the CAP curve. For a perfect model, the
CAP curve looks like a line capturing 100% of the defaulters with fraction of the
population exactly equal to the default rate of the sample. We take the mean over
all the observations, starting from observation 22, in order to have enough statistics
for the CAP Proles to make sense (we recall from the analysis in Section 4.1 that
for the rst 21 observations a very limited number of defaults was reported).
Again, the results are not too dierent, although it can be clearly noticed that
the KMV CAP Prole is steeper than the Moody's one, especially in the percentiles
corresponding to the riskiest companies. In other words, the KMV model seems to
be slightly better at pinning down risky credits. This conrms what we pointed out



















Figure 3: CAP proles calculated for KMV (red line), and for Moody's (blue line).
at the end of Section 4.1, where the KMV superiority in the most dangerous default
probability classes was already identied.




0 Y(X)dX   1
1   f
; (6)
where Y (X) represents the CAP prole function, and f is the actual (observed)
fraction of defaults. Graphically the numerator is twice the area delimited from above
by the CAP prole and from below by the line Y (X) = X, which is - we recall from
above - the CAP prole of a model with no predictive value. The denominator, on
the other hand, is twice the area delimited from below by the same boundary, and
from above by the CAP prole of the ideal model, which would correctly identify the
rst f% of the universe as the subset originating exactly 100% of the defaults (and
therefore could be graphically visualized by a step-like function, connecting the origin
to the point with coordinates (f%;100%), and then remaining at at 100%). For the




Moody0s = 85%; (7)
and seem to be in line with what reported by Moody's in Ref. citeMoodysRat-
Methodology, in the range between 70% and 80%.
4.3 Comparison of Model Promptness at Signalling Defaults
We work with the subset of S&P rated companies available both in the KMV and
the Moody's databases. Starting from observation 24 onwards, we take all the S&P
default-rated companies, record the time of default, T S&P
D , and the time at which
the threshold value of default probability, implying a distressed nancial situation,
is reached, respectively T KMV
D and T
Moody0s
D . We choose to identify the credit distress
threshold by the cuto value of 10:95% in Table 3, corresponding to the worst class
of Moody's ratings. This way, we can quantitatively measure how prompt are the













We nd that a total of 109 companies, out of the 1802 in the common database,
receive an S&P D-rating at some point during the 60 months of observations. For each
of these companies, we evaluate the quantities in Eq. (8). The results are reported in
Table 6 in Appendix A. In both cases we nd a positive lag, meaning that the two
models lead S&P rating at signalling defaults. The average and median (expressed




KMV = 12; (9)




Moody0s = 7: (10)
Both models therefore are capable to lead default events, although KMV seems
to be superior to RiskCalc in the prediction timeliness.
11Using the 1802 companies in the common database, we have also tried to determine
the number of false default alarms we have from the models. For each company
reaching the credit distress threshold, we have checked if a default event really happens
within 12 months from the model warning signal. We have repeated the analysis for





This ratio expresses the percentage of justied default alarms provided by the models.
Assuming that model calibration has been performed correctly, by looking at Table
3, we would expect the average ratio in Eq. 11 to be between 10:95% and 25%. For




Moody0s = 12:00%; (12)
conrming our prediction. Once again, we see that the models give comparable
answers. Both produce a false default alarm in about 88% of the cases.
4.4 Miller Test
To further assess the prediction power of the two models, we perform the non para-
metric test proposed by Miller [7]. Let us consider two risk models, MA and MB. At
each time Ti, we take the population of rms and sort them into groups according
to the MA measure of default risk, so that, in the same group, all rms would have
similar MA-dened default risk. We call these groups MA cohorts. If the MB measure
of default risk has predictive information not contained in the MA measure, we should
be able to nd it in the following fashion. Within each of the MA cohorts, we sort by
values of the MB measure. If the latter has additional power, there will be a higher
default rate for the low quality rms within each MA cohort, as determined by the
MB measure of default risk. In other words, the probability of default will increase
for increasing values of the MB default risk measure. Conversely, if no additional
power is found, the actual defaults should be randomly scattered within a cohort.
The behavior can be identied by means of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. For
each MA cohort, a CAP prole is built which relies on MB default probabilities. The
KS test works by calculating the maximal distance between the CAP prole and the
uniformly distributed CAP prole, which should occur if the MB default risk measure
did not add any value. We perform the Miller test to evaluate the eectiveness of
the default indicators provided both by KMV Credit Monitor and by Moody's Risk
Calc vs. the ocial agency S&P rating. To this purpose, we sort the population of
S&P-rated obligors present in both the KMV and Moody's databases into cohorts,
dened according to the respective default indicators, and study the CAP proles
built on S&P rating. Then we do the reverse, by sorting the population into S&P
rating cohorts, and by studying the CAP proles built respectively on the KMV and










































































































































Figure 4: Miller test results. Plots (a) and (b) show the normalized KS test values per
observation for Cohorts 5 and 6 respectively, dened according to S&P rating. The test is
performed by taking as MB each of the credit models under study, whose information added
value is measured. The dashed line corresponds to Moody's RiskCalc, the continuous line to
KMVCredit Monitor. Plots (c) and (d) show the normalized KS test values per observation for
Cohorts 5 and 6 respectively, dened according to KMV (continuous line) and Moody's (dashed
line) default probability. The test is performed by taking as MB the S&P agency rating, whose
information added value is measured.
Moody's risk measures. In order to have sucient statistics, we only look at the two
worst cohorts, since they originate almost all of the default events. For each case, we
evaluate the ratio between the calculated KS test and the critical value, taken with
a 95% condence level.
We plot the results we have found in Fig. 4 . The value added by the two credit
models with respect to the ocial S&P agency rating are presented in Figs. 4a and
4b. The dashed line refers to Moody's, the continuous line to KMV. We see that, for
all the observations, the normalized KS test values are much higher than the critical
boundary of 1, below which the models would add no value to the information already
contained in the rating. It is also important to notice that the KS test values are
13much higher for cohort 5 than for cohort 6 (compare Figs. 4a and 4b.). We interpret
this as a positive indication of the value added by the credit models, which is higher
for obligors not yet classied in the worst rating class than it is for obligors already
marked as mostly dangerous by the rating agency.
Conversely, we present in Figs. 4c-4d the value added by S&P to the two credit
models. They indicate that for most observations and for both the cohorts studied,
rating seems to add more value to the KMV model than to the Moody's RiskCalc
model, which is exactly what we would expect. In fact some of the nancial ratios un-
derlying the credit assessment by the rating agency are accounted for in the Moody's
RiskCalc Credit Risk measure, as discussed in Section 2 above. This is particularly
evident for Cohort 6, where, for most of the observations, the normalized KS test is
below the signicance boundary of 1.
5 Conclusions
Building on the access to two commercially available databases of default probability
for rms, we develop a set of statistical tests to nd out if those models indeed
add value to the usual rating-grades published by rating agencies. We introduce
the concept of Cumulative Accuracy Prole (CAP) that examines the percentage of
companies defaulting after a year that were captured by the model. The CAP curve
gives in one graph a full information on the quality of the prediction and we see that
for the worst cases both models perform fairly well. Two other statistical studies:
the timeliness of the prediction and the Miller's test conrm the CAP curves. In
particular, Miller's test shows that both models add signicant information to S&P
rating, while the converse is less true.
The results of our study clearly demonstrate that the expected default probabili-
ties provided both by KMV Credit Monitor and Moody's RiskCalc contain informa-
tion that is not captured by the traditional rating and that they would signals risk
of default faster (on average few months faster).
Finally and to answer the question that was raised in the title of this article, we
can say that overall the credit risk models we have studied here do statistically full
most of their promises.
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15A Appendix: Model Predicted vs. Actual De-
faults: Result Tables
In this Appendix we report the detailed results of the test discussed in Section 4.1
above. We start by reporting the results of KMV Credit Monitor. The default
probability classes can be found in Table 4.
KMV Predicted Defaults Actual Defaults
Obs. C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 2
22 0 0 1 3 4 6 0 0 0 5 2 6 2.41
23 0 0 1 3 3 5 0 0 0 6 3 6 2.41
24 0 0 1 3 4 5 0 0 0 9 3 7 4.62
25 0 0 1 4 3 5 0 0 1 8 5 7 2.88
26 0 0 1 4 4 5 0 0 1 7 6 11 3.95
27 0 0 1 4 4 6 0 0 1 6 9 11 4.14
28 0 0 1 4 5 8 0 0 1 6 8 15 3.58
29 0 0 1 5 9 12 0 0 1 2 6 24 5.75
30 0 0 1 5 9 13 0 0 0 1 8 25 7.86
31 0 0 1 5 11 14 0 0 0 3 7 27 6.5
32 0 0 1 6 9 16 0 0 0 1 4 33 12.2
33 0 0 1 5 9 19 0 0 0 1 4 35 10.4
34 0 0 1 5 9 16 0 0 0 1 7 26 7.05
35 0 0 1 6 9 19 0 0 0 1 3 29 9.69
36 0 0 1 6 9 19 0 0 0 0 4 29 11.38
37 0 0 1 6 9 16 0 0 0 1 7 28 8.25
38 0 0 1 6 8 15 0 0 0 3 6 27 5.78
39 0 0 1 5 8 14 0 0 1 2 8 25 4.72
40 0 0 1 6 8 14 0 0 0 2 6 25 6.1
41 0 0 1 5 9 15 0 0 0 3 9 21 3.15
42 0 0 1 6 9 16 0 0 0 2 6 25 5.59
43 0 0 1 6 9 18 0 0 0 3 4 25 5.38
44 0 0 1 5 10 18 0 0 0 4 4 30 7.25
45 0 0 1 5 9 18 0 0 0 4 7 28 4.51
46 0 0 1 6 11 18 0 0 2 2 11 28 4.21
47 0 0 1 6 12 17 0 0 2 3 10 28 3.99
48 0 0 1 6 10 19 0 0 2 1 11 29 6.39
Table 4: Predicted vs. realized defaults for KMV Credit Monitor.
For Moody's RiskCalc we nd instead in Table 5:
KMV Predicted Defaults Actual Defaults
Obs. C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 2
22 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 2 5 3 0.96
23 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 1 7 4 1.91
24 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 4 7 5 3.59
25 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 3 5 6 6 5.54
26 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 7 7 7 7.98
27 0 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 9 9 5 8.73
28 0 0 1 2 3 2 0 0 3 7 11 7 8.39
29 0 0 1 2 6 3 0 0 1 6 16 9 8.19
30 0 0 1 3 7 5 0 0 0 3 11 18 9.06
31 0 0 1 3 9 6 0 0 1 4 10 20 6.94
32 0 0 1 3 10 8 0 0 0 2 8 26 11.61
33 0 0 1 2 10 8 0 0 0 2 9 27 11.97
34 0 0 1 3 10 7 0 0 0 4 8 21 8.45
35 0 0 1 3 11 8 0 0 0 1 7 24 11.24
36 0 0 1 3 11 9 0 0 0 0 10 22 10.93
37 0 0 1 3 11 9 0 0 0 1 11 23 9.15
38 0 0 1 3 10 9 0 0 1 2 12 20 5.04
39 0 0 1 3 9 8 0 0 1 3 12 20 5.62
40 0 0 1 3 9 7 0 0 1 2 15 14 4.25
41 0 0 1 3 9 6 0 0 1 3 18 10 3.93
42 0 0 1 2 8 5 0 0 2 2 19 10 5.76
43 0 0 1 2 8 5 0 0 2 3 18 9 4.26
44 0 0 1 3 8 7 0 0 3 2 14 19 7.48
45 0 0 1 3 8 8 0 0 1 6 10 22 8.02
46 0 0 1 3 8 8 0 0 0 6 15 22 11.34
47 0 0 1 3 9 8 1 0 1 2 18 22 10.94
48 0 0 1 3 9 7 0 1 0 2 21 20 12.17
Table 5: Predicted vs. realized defaults for Moody's RiskCalc.
16Finally we report the complete results of the test for model promptness, discussed
in Section 4.3 above.
17Company Name S&P D-Time KMV D-Time KMV Moody's Caa-Time Moody0s
ACME METALS 34 28 6 28 6
KAISER GROUP INTL INC 40 5 35 34 6
ANACOMP INC 55 1 54 51 4
ARMSTRONG HOLDINGS INC 56 55 1 55 1
BEN FRANKLIN RETAIL STORES 4 1 3 1 3
BK ENTERTAINMENT 38 15 23 29 9
BREED TECHNOLOGIES INC 42 34 8 31 11
CARMIKE CINEMAS INC -CL A 53 51 2 52 1
COHO ENERGY INC 36 33 3 35 1
AXIOHM TRANSACTION SOLUTIONS 44 31 13 32 12
EAGLE FOOD CENTERS INC 48 42 6 44 4
EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS INC 49 26 23 35 14
METAL MANAGMENT INC 56 30 26 31 25
GENESIS HEALTH VENTURES INC 48 36 12 44 4
GENEVA STL CO -CL A 35 21 14 31 4
GEOTEK COMMUNICATIONS 34 20 14 22 12
GRAHAM FIELD HEALTH PDS 45 36 9 44 1
IMPERIAL SUGAR CO 57 48 9 48 9
INTEGRATED HEALTH SVCS INC 44 35 9 42 2
AMERICAN BANKNOTE CORP 39 12 27 30 9
KCS ENERGY INC 40 29 11 30 10
KENETECH CORP 3 1 2 1 2
L A GEAR INC 34 20 14 20 14
LTV CORP 57 50 7 55 2
MARINER POST-ACUTE NTWRK INC 43 31 12 36 7
LOEHMANNS INC 38 17 21 14 24
METROCALL INC 60 12 48 43 17
NORTHWESTERN STL & WIRE 57 16 41 34 23
PAGING NETWORK INC 47 31 16 13 34
PHONETEL TECHNOLOGIES INC 34 2 32 26 8
PILLOWTEX CORP 56 41 15 37 19
PRANDIUM INC 59 58 1 4 55
SAFETY-KLEEN 50 48 2 49 1
SALANT CORP 34 17 17 23 11
SERVICE MERCHANDISE CO 36 32 4 30 6
CAREMATRIX CORPORATION 56 42 14 44 12
BRAZOS SPORTSWEAR INC 34 27 7 28 6
TOKHEIM CORP 53 43 10 44 9
TOWER AIR INC 47 8 39 30 17
TOWN & COUNTRY CORP -CL A 34 1 33 13 21
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES 58 43 15 9 49
TULTEX CORP 38 33 5 33 5
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTL 58 55 3 58 0
DECORA INDS INC 56 44 12 45 11
INACOM CORP 51 36 15 51 0
WORLDTEX INC 57 36 21 37 20
SEMI-TECH CORP -CL A 42 11 31 13 29
PHILIP SERVICES CORP 34 28 6 31 3
AMERICAN ECO CORP 50 33 17 50 0
LAIDLAW INC 50 48 2 49 1
ROYAL OAK MINES INC 35 26 9 25 10
ICG COMMUNICATIONS 56 50 6 32 24
DRYPERS CORP 55 4 51 1 54
TRISM INC 40 1 39 30 10
SAFETY COMPONENTS INTL INC 46 42 4 44 2
LIVENT 34 32 2 32 2
FPA MEDICAL MGMT INC 34 26 8 27 7
US OFFICE PRODUCTS CO 60 29 31 30 30
CHS ELECTRONICS INC 49 4 45 37 12
AT TRACK COMMUNICATIONS INC 59 28 31 30 29
CROWN VANTAGE INC 48 12 36 11 37
PHYSICIANS RESOURCE GRP INC 34 29 5 32 2
FORCENERGY 36 29 7 30 6
WASTE SYSTEMS INTL INC 58 5 53 13 45
WIRELESS ONE INC 36 10 26 12 24
UNISON HEALTHCARE CORP 20 12 8 13 7
DECISIONONE HOLDINGS CORP 41 29 12 29 12
PLANET HOLLYWOOD INTL INC 37 38 -1 35 2
PARACELSUS HEALTHCARE CORP 47 21 26 31 16
AMERICAN PAD & PAPER CO 45 27 18 22 23
DAILEY INTL INC -CL A 39 29 10 32 7
SEABULK INTERNATIONAL INC 41 29 12 35 6
KITTY HAWK INC 50 40 10 49 1
STAGE STORES INC 51 34 17 36 15
STYLING TECHNOLOGY CORP 46 33 13 44 2
HURRICANE HYDROCARBONS LTD 38 29 9 34 4
UNIFORET INC 49 45 4 31 18
EAGLE GEOPHYSICAL INC 40 32 8 39 1
AMF BOWLING INC 54 31 23 35 19
USN COMMUNICATIONS INC 35 28 7 30 5
VLASIC FOODS INTERNATIONAL 58 47 11 46 12
LOEWS CINEPLEX ENTMT CORP 59 50 9 55 4
MASTER GRAPHICS INC 51 33 18 45 6
AMERN ARCHITECTURAL PDS INC 51 40 11 38 13
NORTHPOINT COMMUNICATIONS GP 58 56 2 44 14
ETOYS INC 60 56 4 56 4
PNV INC 56 50 6 52 4
Table 6: Model promptness at signalling default events: the Table reports for each of the
default events in the time window analyzed, the time lag between the model signal and
the actual default event.
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